Microchips and National Sovereignty: when technology becomes a threat

Guido Donati* 12 Set 2025



Today, every aspect of our lives is governed by a microscopic piece of silicon. From the phones we carry in our pockets to the grids that power our cities, microchips are the beating heart of the modern world. But while planned obsolescence and the Phoebus Cartel (1, 2) taught us that technology can be manipulated for profit, the race for microchips reveals a much more uncomfortable truth: technological dependence has become the new frontier of control and national security. Globalization, once celebrated as a bridge between nations, has created a complex and vulnerable network that can be exploited for much more sinister purposes, a hidden weapon ready to strike at the heart of national sovereignty.


The most insidious danger lies in what we can't see: "backdoors" (secret access points) at the hardware or firmware (the software that instructs the hardware how to function) level. These aren't simple software bugs, but security flaws intentionally built into a chip's design. States and corporations can have these malicious elements inserted into mass-market devices, such as our smartphones, home routers, or, even more worryingly, into components of a country's critical infrastructure, such as electrical grids or communication systems. The fear is that a nation that dominates chip production can influence its manufacturers to integrate these vulnerabilities.

A silent weapon, a systemic threat
In this scenario, an seemingly innocuous device, like a solar inverter, could be transformed into a spying tool, collecting sensitive data about our electrical grids, or even become a lethal weapon, capable of remotely shutting down an entire section of the grid and causing a strategic blackout. Companies are exposed to the risk of industrial espionage, with the possibility that compromised components could allow competitors to steal trade secrets. At the same time, individual citizens are at risk of mass surveillance. A cell phone, a voice assistant, or any connected device containing a compromised chip could theoretically become a data source for an industry or a foreign power, violating personal privacy and, by extension, threatening individual security which, on a large scale, translates into a risk to national security.


The rising tensions between the United States and China clearly show how control over microchips has become a central issue of national security. The "chip war" isn't just about technological dominance but about a nation's ability to ensure its sovereignty and protect itself from possible blackmail. Export restrictions on technology and the race to build new semiconductor factories (fabs) are direct responses to this threat, in an attempt to rebuild more resilient supply chains.

Strategic measures and supply chain reorganization
The awareness of the vulnerability linked to the microchip supply chain has triggered a global reaction. Nations are shifting from a logic of maximum efficiency, based on globalization and sourcing from a single provider, to one of resilience and security. This change is evident in several strategies:
Hoarding of rare earths and critical minerals. The race for technological sovereignty doesn't stop at production but extends to the initial phase of the supply chain. Nations are intensifying efforts to secure control of mines and trade routes for rare earths and other essential elements, such as lithium, cobalt, and gallium. These materials are indispensable for manufacturing the most advanced microchips and for the technologies of the future, creating a new front of geopolitical competition.


Massive incentives for domestic production. Countries like the United States, through the CHIPS and Science Act, and the European Union, with the Chips Act, are investing billions of dollars to incentivize the construction of new fabs on their territory. The goal is to reduce dependency on Asia, particularly Taiwan, which produces the vast majority of the most advanced chips.
Export restrictions. Superpowers use control over the export of advanced technologies and machinery to slow down the technological development of rival countries. This is a key element of the "chip war" between the US and China, where restrictions aim to prevent Beijing from achieving autonomy in high-end chip production.
Diversification efforts. Companies and governments are actively seeking to diversify their sources of supply. This isn't just about building new factories but also about investing in research and development in allied nations, creating a more distributed supply network that's less susceptible to interruptions or sabotage.

Impact on the economy and society
These dynamics have a profound impact that goes beyond national security:
Rising costs. Production in nations with higher labor and operational costs, such as the United States or Europe, will likely make chips more expensive, with a ripple effect on all electronic devices. This could affect the price of smartphones, computers, and even cars, directly impacting consumers.
Cross-sector collaboration. The crisis has pushed for greater cooperation between sectors that depend on microchips, such as the automotive industry, defense, and consumer electronics. These sectors are working together to develop security standards and ensure the traceability of components.
Risk of technological fragmentation. Policies of technological nationalism could lead to market fragmentation, with incompatible standards and technologies between geopolitical blocs. This could slow down global innovation and create a "technologically divided" world.

The role of ethics and transparency
Finally, we could introduce a reflection on the ethical aspect. How can we ensure that the pursuit of technological sovereignty doesn't lead to an increase in surveillance and control by governments over their own citizens? The same technology that protects us from external threats could become a tool for internal control.
It's fundamental that, while nations seek to secure their supply chains, they also introduce mechanisms of control and transparency to prevent abuses and safeguard personal privacy and civil liberties. This balance between security, sovereignty, and individual freedom is the greatest challenge of our time.


Bibliography
1. Guido Donati 2025 Planned Obsolescence, from the Phoebus Cartel to Today: Can a Light Bulb Last More Than 125 Years? Scienceonline
2. Guido Donati 2025 L'obsolescenza programmata, dal Cartello Phoebus a oggi: una lampadina può durare più di 125 anni? Scienzaonline
3. EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS 8/04/2025 Special report 12/2025: The EU’s strategy for microchips – Reasonable progress in its implementation but the Chips Act is very unlikely to be sufficient to reach the overly ambitious Digital Decade target 
4. Linda Monsees The paradox of semiconductors—EU governance between sovereignty and interdependence Cambridge Review of International Affairs Volume 38, 2025 

 

 *Board Member, SRSN (Roman Society of Natural Science) Past Editor-in-Chief Italian Journal of Dermosurgery

 

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Scienzaonline con sottotitolo Sciencenew  - Periodico
Autorizzazioni del Tribunale di Roma – diffusioni:
telematica quotidiana 229/2006 del 08/06/2006
mensile per mezzo stampa 293/2003 del 07/07/2003
Scienceonline, Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Roma 228/2006 del 29/05/06
Pubblicato a Roma – Via A. De Viti de Marco, 50 – Direttore Responsabile Guido Donati

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